Introduction
Most western European countries currently face the problem of low fertility rates and increasing life expectancy. Scientists and politicians are starting to realise that, in the long run, this may severely endanger the welfare system or at least the level of economic wellbeing in their countries. In this situation, selective immigration is considered to be one possible tool not to solve this problem, but at least to diminish it. This strategy, however, goes clearly against public opinion--on the whole, immigrants are considered to be an economic burden rather than a relief. This persistent prejudice is hard to refute, because scientific knowledge in this field is still scarce.
From an economic point of view, the question of whether immigrants--or specific subgroups of the immigrant population--tend to enrich or burden the native-born population is an important issue: "(The) cost-benefit calculation will surely be a key component of the immigration debate that is likely to dominate domestic public policy in the next decade" (Borjas 1995, p. 279) . Most research in this specific field focuses on differences between immigrants and the native-born population with respect to the receipt of public benefits, but neglects the other side of the cost-benefit calculation: "An overall judgment on the effects of immigrants on future government expenditures should take into account the tax contributions of immigrants and natives as well as the expenditures for them. However, no recent study provides data on household incomes of natives and immigrants; hence there is no solid basis for estimating the taxes paid by the two groups." (Simon 1996, p. 107) . After all, the crucial question is: "Do (immigrants) consume more services from the public sector than they pay for in taxes?" (Schultz 1998, p. 245) , or more specifically: "Who's financing whom? Do immigrants subsidize the native population or vice versa? Is immigration a cost factor or a net benefit for the public transfer system?" (Weber & Straubhaar 1996, p. 350) .
As Bhattarai & Whalley (1997) clearly point out, these questions cannot be answered by analysing only the take-up of public transfers such as welfare benefits (cf. Jensen 1988 , Maani 1993 , Khoo 1994 , Gustman & Steinmeier 1998 ,Riphahn 1998 , Hu 1998 1 . An appropriate 1 Studies focusing on this issue constitute a major field of research in the context of immigration. The general expectation is that take-up intensity among immigrants will decrease with increasing duration of stay Voges 1997, Voges, Frick, and Büchel, 1998) . However, a contradictory result has been presented by Baker and Benjamin (1995) . This might be explained by varying institutional settings across the countries in which these studies were conducted. Borjas & Hilton (1996) believe that social networks among immigrants lead to higher take-up rates in this group. This interpretation is challenged by Zavodny (1997) , however. Voges, Frick, and Büchel (1998) as well as Bird et al. (forthcoming) state that welfare recipience is higher among immigrants than among the native population, and the latter even find that take-up rates among immigrants are above average in the case of eligibility. However, both studies conclude that these findings can be attributed to the less favorable social structure of immigrant populations, i.e., that different ethnic origin 2 approach must consider both the receipt of benefits and the contribution to the tax and welfare system. LaLonde & Topel (1991) report that immigrants to the USA have lower incomes than the native-born population, but bear this burden for themselves, that is, without any serious effects on the host population. Julian Simon (1996) confirms this finding for the US of the 1970s, but shows that the picture for more recent periods is no longer as clear. Rürup and Sesselmeier (1994) state that immigrants to Germany are net payers with respect to the unemployment insurance and medical aid systems. With respect to the old age pension system, however, results seem to be less clear because of uncontrollable and unpredictable interdependent effects. For Switzerland, Weber & Straubhaar (1996) report that immigrants are net payers to the tax and social security system. 2 It is obvious that cost-benefit analyses in the context of immigration are strongly influenced by institutional settings, mainly with respect to immigration policy and the structure of the welfare system. As a consequence, it is highly questionable whether results from a specific country can be generalised to other countries, and adopted as guidelines for immigration policy-makers elsewhere. The present analysis is therefore a cross-country one, focusing on two important west European countries with differing structures of immigration and institutional settings: the UK and Germany. The aim of the present paper is to analyse whether (and if so, to what extent) institutional settings such as immigration policy and the structure of the tax and welfare system influence immigrants' economic performance, or, in other words, whether the immigrant population actually burdens or disburdens the economic system of the immigration countries.
2.
Immigration Policy and the Welfare System in the UK and Germany:
Some Stylised Characteristics

Immigration Policy
Although there are substantial differences between the immigration policies of the UK and Germany, some important similarities can be stated. "The immigration policies of the UK have been driven primarily by political, rather than economic concerns" (Wheatley Price 2001a, p. 195) . Since the 1973 stop to the worker-recruitment policy of the 1960s and early is not a risk factor per se.
3 1970s (Anwerbe-Stopp), the same has also been true of Germany. 3 In both countries, substantial numbers of the indigenous population express major concerns about additional immigration (Simon & Lynch 1999) . This attitude may be influenced by the fact that, in both countries, immigrants are over-represented among the involuntary unemployed, and that immigrants are considered to be less ambitious in looking for jobs than native-born people (cf. Thomas 1998) . In both countries, the re-unification of early immigrants' families makes a strong contribution to the overall number of non-indigenous persons in the population.
Similarly, Islamic immigrants are considered to be those with the lowest assimilation status in both countries. This is attributed to their low qualifications, large family sizes, low employment aptitudes of women, and close-knit ethnic networks. In the UK, the Islamic population is dominated by Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 4 , in Germany by Turks. In both countries, there are certain groups that have privileged immigration status owing to historical responsibilities--in the UK, those from (former) British colonies and dominions, and in Germany, people of German extraction (Aussiedler), moving back to Germany from Eastern
Europe and other countries of the former Soviet Union. 5 Last but not least, both countries implement strong immigration controls in order to discourage refugees and asylum seekers from crossing their borders, on the basis that these groups are without a doubt those most likely to burden the welfare state.
Beyond these similarities, there are some country-specific differences which are worthy of note. In contrast to Germany, the UK has a tradition of attracting not only less educated people, but also highly skilled workers. Some of the Indians and many of the Asians immigrating to the UK import above-average skills. 6 In Germany, highly qualified immigrants are comparatively rare. In the 1960s and 1970s, large numbers of so-called 'guest workers'
were hired from southern European countries to perform low-skill jobs. 7 Furthermore, German immigrants in general face severe language problems, an obstacle to integration that is also observable among UK immigrants (cf. Dustman 1996; Dustmann & Fabbri 2000) , but 2 Additional studies are reported in Weber and Straubhaar (1996, Table 1, p. 335) .
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In the five years preceding the Anwerbe-Stopp, the number of foreigners living in West Germany increased dramatically from 1.9 to 4.0 million people (cf. Münz et al. 1997: 40) , a development that was considered to exceed the integration capacity of the native-born population.
4 Blackaby et al. (1999) point out that cultural settings and religion play a more central role than race in the analysis of labour market inequalities, arguing that it would otherwise be very difficult to explain the substantial differences in this respect between Indians on the one hand and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis on the other (see also Dale & Holdsworth 1998 for a report on the atypically low labour market participation of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women).
5
See Zimmermann (1999) for background information about this specific group. 6
In fact, Bell (1997) states that, on average, the immigrant population has more schooling than the native population, and that this gap is actually increasing over time. 7
Aussiedler generally have a level of formal qualification which--measured in institutional years of full-time education--is almost as high as that of indigenous Germans, but these skills do not fit the needs of western labour markets. 4 seemingly to a lesser degree than in Germany. In the UK, self-employment is higher among immigrants than among the native population (Clark & Drinkwater 1998);  8 in Germany, this kind of labour market status is atypical for immigrants (Seifert 2000) . Finally, the sharpest contrast is that, contrary to the situation in the UK, racial disparities do not play an important role in the German immigration discussion (disregarding for a moment the very specific situation of the relatively small group of refugees and asylum seekers in Germany). 9 For background information about immigration policy and the social structure of immigration in the UK, see Coleman & Salt (1992, p. 433ff., p. 472ff.) , Layton-Henry (1994 ), Freeman (1994 , and Hatton & Wheatley Price (1999) ; for analogous information about Germany, see Martin (1994) , Brubaker (1994) , Hönekopp (1994) , Rotte (1998), and Deutscher Bundestag (1998, p. 94ff.) . For recent changes in immigration policy and the structure of immigration, see OECD (2001, p. 185ff. [Germany] 10 and p. 264ff.
[UK]).
Tax System, Welfare System, and Redistribution
Following Esping-Andersen (1990), the UK is considered to belong to the group of 'liberal' welfare states characterised by relatively low taxes, low means-tested assistance, and modest universal transfers and social insurance plans. 11 Benefits cater mainly to a low-income clientele, mainly to prevent the (very) 'worst case' scenario (cf. Hills 1995 , Fazeli 1996 , Goodman et al. 1997 . for an overview). Nevertheless, similarly to the German welfare system, the UK system includes a state earnings-related pension system (in Germany:
Rentenversicherung), child benefits (Kindergeld), unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosenunterstützung), incapacity benefit (Invalidenrente), income support and housing benefits (Sozialhilfe and Wohngeld). These are the traditional core elements to protect the inhabitants of any major welfare state from falling into poverty. Although policy-makers are still rather reluctant to fully adopt EU social policy standards in the UK, the influence of the European 8 Black Caribbeans constitute an exception here (cf. Borooah & Hart 1999) . 9
The fact that the question of race does have some weight, not in the public immigration debate, but in the private discussions of those opposed to immigration, may be seen as an expression of racist behaviour detached from the "real" social problems associated with the extremely small non-white population in Germany. 10
Most recently, German politicians--backed up by the United Nations Population Division (2000) report stating that there is a substantial need for immigration to Germany in order to combat the demographic problems of the ageing country--started to think more carefully about another paradigm change. The Expert Commission on Immigration ('ZuwanderungsKommission') is expected to present its suggestions about the formulation of a new immigration law to the German Chancellor in the late summer of 2001. However, leaked reports suggest that specific labour market demands will substantially influence the number of people allowed to immigrate, as well as the socio-economic structure of the future immigrant population. 11
See also Mitchell (1991, p. 181ff.) , Headey et al. (1997) as well as Goodin et al. (1999) for discussion of this typology of welfare regimes.
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Union tends to steer the British welfare system somewhat further away from the classic 'liberal' systems such as the US (Bagilhole 1997, p. 78ff.) .
In contrast, Germany is considered to be a typical representative of the 'corporatist' welfare system, in which the male breadwinner model is supported. Well-established public pension and health care schemes as well as the unemployment insurance system protect against "traditional" income risks. People at risk of poverty are expected to rely primarily on their families, except in the initial phase unemployment. If the family is no longer able to support a family member, the welfare state steps in and provides substantial assistance to prevent poverty. Redistribution effects in this type of welfare regime are expected to be rather large when compared to more liberal systems, especially in terms of poverty protection. High priority is given to the stabilisation of household income. Furthermore, due to large redistribution effects, income inequality is rather low in this system with its extended welfare programs and relatively high taxes (cf. Jäntti 1993 , Ankrom 1993 , Duclos 1993 , Ervik 1998  for a general overview of the topic of redistribution, see Falkingham & Hills 1995) .
3.
Data and Methods
Data
The UK section of our analysis is based on the British Household Panel Study (BHPS). This representative household panel survey, directed by the Institute for Social and Economic
Research (ISER) at the University of Essex, was initiated in 1991. Starting with 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals who are re-interviewed yearly, it has become one of the most important databases for social researchers using British data (for further details, see Taylor, 1998, or http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps) . 12 In the present study, we use data from 1995 to 1998. In the BHPS, respondents are asked to give information on their income over the 12-month period preceding the interview. As such, our analysis covers respondents' income for the period from September 1, 1994 to August 31, 1998.
The German part of the analysis is based on representative micro-data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which also is an ongoing panel survey with a yearly reinterview design. The starting sample in 1984 was of similar size to that of the BHPS. In
12
We are most grateful to Stephen Jenkins, who provided us with a special data set drawn from the BHPS with a beta version of the necessary income components information (for documentation of annual income data based on the BHPS, see 6 contrast to the BHPS, the immigrant population was over-sampled in the GSOEP, thus facilitating analyses of this particular population (for further details, see SOEP-Group, 2001 , Wagner et al., 1993 http://www.diw.de/english/sop). Due to the fact that almost no immigrants live in East Germany, and that East German income structures still differ markedly from West German ones (Büchel & Frick 2000) , we restrict our analysis to the West German part of the GSOEP. Furthermore, we exclude refugees and asylum seekers because of their very specific income situation. 13 We use data collected from 1995 to 1999, including the new "immigrant" sub-sample initiated in 1994/95 (Burkhauser, Kreyenfeld, & Wagner 1997) .
In terms of retrospective income information, we therefore analyse income years 1994 to 1998. 14 In all descriptive analyses, appropriate weighting factors are applied for both samples.
Level of Analysis and Definition of Ethnic Groups
The unit of analysis is the individual in his or her respective household context. Households are categorised into different ethnic groups according to the ethnicity of the adult household members (aged 17 and over). After categorisation at the household level, all members of a household (including dependent children) are given the same ethnicity status, regardless of their legal nationality.
Ethnic subpopulations in the UK are mainly discussed in terms of race differences (see, for example, Berthoud, 1998 Because there is no German equivalent to the race concept, we further distinguish according Bardasi et al. 1999) . 13 In West Germany, asylum seekers were not allowed to be gainfully employed during the observation period. These restrictions have been somewhat eased since the year 2000. However, because most applicants for asylum live in special shelters (which are not covered by the GSOEP sample), we exclude only the very few individuals atypically living in private homes. 14 This annual income information comes from the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF, see Burkhauser et al. 2000) . Since the GSOEP collects only information on gross income, a simulation module is used in the SOEP section of the CNEF to calculate individual tax and social security contributions and post-government income. This simulation only takes progression rules and basic allowances into account (cf. Schwarze 1995); as such, it might overestimate real tax payments given that potential tax exemptions--which are very often concentrated at the upper tail of the income distribution--are not considered adequately. 7 to the region of origin of the non-indigenous population: i) native-born immigrants (regardless of race; 'immigrants' in a broader sense) 16 ; ii) Commonwealth; iii) European Union; iv) other.
Again, the reference group is the indigenous population, consisting of the native-born white population. In West Germany, we distinguish the following non-indigenous groups: i) nativeborn non-Germans; ii) ethnic Germans (Aussiedler); iii) European Union; iv) other.
In our models, we include a further distinction with respect to the assimilation status of immigrants. Following the concept developed by Büchel & Frick (2000) , we distinguish between so-called 'non-mixed' and 'mixed' immigrant households. A 'non-mixed' household is characterised by the fact that all adults in the household are immigrants. On the other hand, a 'mixed' (immigrant) household is characterised by the fact that at least one adult is a member of the indigenous population. This kind of situation is assumed to reflect a higher degree of integration of the immigrant member(s) of the household.
Income Components, Relative Income Positions, and Redistribution Measures
Although we analyse income at the individual level, income information is calculated at the household level. The assumption underlying this approach is that all members of a specific household pool their resources and share the utility of a given household income.
Consequently, information about the various (equivalent) income components of a specific household is ascribed to all members of that household, regardless of age or individual income performance.
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Given our interest in differences between the immigrant and indigenous populations, we analyse the following income components for each of the subgroups described above: i) employment income; ii) capital income (including imputed rent for owner-occupied housing);
iii) private transfers. The sum of these three components represents pre-government (or market) income. Adding iv) old age pensions and v) public transfers, 18 and subtracting vi) taxes and social security contributions finally yields our measure of post-government income.
15 See also Blackaby et al. (1998) in this context. 16
As Bell (1997) and Shields & Wheatley Price (1998) point out, it is importnat to differentiate between native-born and foreign-born immigrants in this context. 17
In order to adjust for differences in household size and composition, we apply the modified OECD equivalence scale, which gives weights of 1.0 to the head, 0.5 to other adult household members, and 0.3 to children. In order to reduce the effect of extreme income outliers, we eliminate all households with post-government incomes of less than 600 GBP or 1200 DM respectively. Finally, after deflating all income measures, we pool the observations across all analysable crosssectional years. 18
For Germany, public transfers include housing benefits, child benefits, subsistence allowances and special circumstances benefits from the Social Welfare Authority, student grants, maternity benefits, unemployment benefits, unemployment benefits, and unemployment subsistence allowance. For the UK, our measure of public transfers is based on 8 All income components are standardised by relating individual income to the respective mean of the total population in each country (total mean = 100%; for Germany: West Germany).
The effect of redistribution is measured by subtracting the relative income position based on pre-government income from that based on post-government income for each individual. This yields a metric measure which is positive (negative) for those who improve (worsen) their income position as a result of the redistribution process.
Steps of Analysis
All steps of the analysis were run separately for the UK and West Germany. For the UK, descriptive measures were first broken down by race, and later by region of origin (for reasons of simplicity we will refer to 'ethnic groups' regardless of the disaggregation measure used); for Germany, measures are broken down according to region of origin only.
We start by comparing the relative income positions within each of the analysed income components by ethnic group. In a first step, we focus on aggregates (market income, nonmarket income, taxes and social security contributions; Tables 1-UK, 1-GE). Various components of market and non-market incomes are then analysed in more detailed form (Tables 2-UK, 2-GE). In a second step, we calculate the various income components as a share of total post-government income for each ethnic group ("portfolio structure"; Tables 3-UK, 3-GE). In order to reduce the impact of different age distributions, 19 and to focus on the economic performance and capacity for self-support in different ethnic subgroups, we generally restrict our analyses to those living in households with a head of prime age (20 to 60 years; "labour market integration approach").
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The multivariate analyses are also restricted to this prime-age group. We specify randomeffects regression models (GLS models) controlling for various SES measures to analyse a) relative income positions based on pre-government income (Tables 4-UK, 4-GE) as well as b) changes in the relative income position due to the redistribution process within the tax and welfare system (Tables 5-UK , 5-GE). For both sub-steps we run four types of models, detailed information on different types of social security benefits received by each member of a given household. However, the structure of housing benefits is somewhat different in wave 1 than thereafter (see Bardasi et al. 1999, p. 19) . 19 The age structure of ethnic groups (and hence the proportion of older people per ethnic group) is strongly dependent on the group-specific immigration patterns (see, e.g., Leslie et al. 1997, p. 43 for the UK, and Clark & York 2000 for Germany). In addition, group-specific differential mortality can also be expected to affect redistribution patterns (Creedy et al. 1993) . 20
See Appendix for descriptive results based on the total population. 9 controlling for the heterogeneity of immigrants in various forms: i) by a simple dummy variable 'immigrant: yes/no'; column 1); ii) by two dummies: 'non-mixed' or 'mixed' immigrant household (reference category: indigenous population; column 2); iii) by race (UK model only) and region-of-origin dummies (reference category: indigenous population; column 3); iv) by restricting the sample to immigrants and controlling for race (UK model only) and region of origin (reference category: immigrants from EU countries; column 4). Table 6 contains descriptive information (means, standard deviations) of all variables used in our analyses.
Empirical Results
Relative Income Position in Various Types of Income
In the UK, immigrants from the Commonwealth and the European Union show substantially higher pre-government incomes than the native-born white population, whereas those who migrated from 'other' countries show income levels fairly similar to those of the indigenous population (first panel of Table 1 -UK). The only immigrant group with a clearly belowaverage economic performance is that of native-born non-whites. This would seem to refute the speculation that "the process of assimilation may mean that long-term migrants have more in common with natives than with recently arrived migrants" (Denny et al. 1997: 14) . Overall, even when including native-born non-whites, the economic performance of immigrants to the UK is similar to that of the indigenous population. Moreover, immigrants receive similar levels of non-market incomes to the indigenous population. Native-born non-whites receive by far the highest non-market incomes. The pattern of contributions to the tax and social security system reflects the pattern observed for pre-government income. Consequently, the group-specific levels of post-government incomes are similarly distributed to the levels of pre-government incomes. The poor situation of native-born non-whites (with only 78% of the national average income), however, improves only marginally (to 83%) following the transfer of fairly large amounts of non-market incomes. One should bear in mind, however, that this group is considerably younger (average age of household head: 36 years) than the remaining population (where the average age of the household head is 41 years). As such, market income (labour and capital income) are more likely to be relatively low.
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When distinguishing by race instead of region of origin, we observe very low pre-government incomes among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, who earn less than one third of the average income of the total population. Blacks are much better off, but still show substantially lower incomes (72% of the population average) than the total population. White immigrants and 'others' (mainly Chinese people) exhibit above-average incomes. With respect to non-market incomes, blacks are at the very top (160%), followed by Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (149%).
These are the ethnic groups with the highest unemployment rates (Blackaby et al. 1997; Boddy 1998; Fieldhouse & Gould 1998; Leslie & Drinkwater 1999; Carmichael & Woods 2000) . Dependence on non-market incomes is below average for white immigrants (76%) and Indians (82%). The tax and social security contributions of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are equivalent to only one fourth of the average contributed by the total population; blacks and Indians also remain below the mean. Ultimately, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis show a postgovernment income level equivalent to only 45% that of the total population, whereas Blacks at least reach the 80% level. White and 'other' immigrants such as Chinese people outperform the indigenous population in terms of post-government income.
In West Germany, a very different picture emerges. On the whole, immigrants show much lower pre-government incomes than native-born Germans. Aussiedler and 'other' immigrants,
i.e. non-EU immigrants, are the worst off. Native-born foreigners and immigrants from EU countries show similar pre-government incomes to the indigenous population, but without quite reaching the indigenous level. Native-born foreigners receive very low non-market incomes, whereas Aussiedler draw a remarkably high level of benefits. The distribution of taxes and social security contributions is similar to that observed for pre-government incomes, with one exception: native-born foreigners make higher contributions than expected. As is the case for the UK, it should be borne in mind that--almost by definition--households of native-born foreigners in Germany are much younger (average age of head: 35 years) than in any other immigrant group (43 years) or indeed in the indigenous population (41 years).
Summing up, the results presented in this section show a much wider heterogeneity in the economic performance of UK immigrants than in that of immigrants to West Germany. In the UK, the economic performance of the immigrant population as a whole is similar to that of the indigenous population, and some groups of immigrants substantially outperform the native 
Relative Income Position in Specific Components of Market and Non-Market Income
In the UK, the level of pre-government income is largely determined by employment income ( To gain a better insight into the structure of the non-market income received by immigrants, we separated old age pensions from public benefits. The former are of limited value in the present study because our sample is restricted to people living in households with prime-age heads. 21 We therefore concentrate on the interpretation of the income from public benefits, and are able to observe a similar level of public benefit receipt among native-born whites and immigrants. However, there are some outlier groups: native-born non-whites receive by far higher benefits, as do blacks as well as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.
In Germany, too, employment incomes constitute the major part of pre-government income ( Another striking difference to the UK is found for the structure of private transfers. Whereas this income component was twice as high among UK immigrants than in the indigenous population, it is only half as high in Germany. Ethnic networks providing mutual support seem to be much more common in the UK than in Germany. Finally, when focusing on public benefits, we again find marked differences between the UK and the German immigrant populations relative to the respective indigenous populations. In total, UK immigrants draw a similar level of public benefits as do native-born whites. In Germany, immigrants receive 30% higher levels of public transfers than do native-born Germans. Those coming from non-EU countries and especially the group of Aussiedler receive the highest levels of public benefits. However, the relative level of public benefits received by these groups is still substantially lower than that claimed by blacks and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the UK.
The Structure of Post-Government Income ("Portfolio")
We now turn to our income portfolio analysis, in which all income components are related to the individual post-government income. In the UK, the total non-indigenous population shows a similar post-government income structure to the indigenous reference group (Table 3-UK) .
Market income represents about 100% of post-government income, about 20% of the income portfolio comes from non-market incomes (in this age group, mainly public benefits) and about the same share is deducted for taxes and contributions to the social security system. Again, however, there is substantial variation within the non-indigenous population. Among native-born non-whites, as well as blacks and immigrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh, market incomes play a much smaller role in the structure of the income portfolio than in any other group. Once again, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi population is by far the worst off.
Their market income constitutes only about 60% of their total income, with public benefits making up about half their portfolio. As a consequence, their contribution to the tax and social 21 Cf. Appendix for results based on the total population to see the increased relevance of public pensions. 22
These results can in part be attributed to the inclusion of imputed rental value for owner-occupied housing in our measure of capital income (as suggested by Smeeding & Weinberg, 2001) . Not surprisingly, the proportion of owneroccupiers is by far the highest in the indigenous population. It should be noted that the inclusion of imputed rent in our income measure does not change the principal structure depicted here; rather, it accentuates the overall results. For the international comparison of the UK and Germany it might be helpful to know that the proportion of the population profiting from these fictitious incomes in 1998 was above 60% in the UK and about 35% in West Germany (cf. Frick & Grabka, transfer system is less than 10%, and as such much lower than in any other group. Black immigrants on average constitute another UK risk group, although their economic selfsupporting capacity is somewhat superior to that of Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants.
In Germany, a rather different picture emerges (Table 3-GE) . First of all, the different institutional settings within the tax and social security system have obvious effects. In Germany, 36% of total income is redistributed by the 'corporatist' welfare state. In contrast to the UK, the employment incomes of the total non-indigenous population represent a substantially lower proportion of post-government income than is the case for the native-born German population. In addition, capital income is of much less importance among the nonindigenous population. However, native-born foreigners and immigrants from the EU countries form an exception here; they show remarkably high shares for market incomes, and public benefits make no substantial contribution to their income portfolio.
Determinants of Relative Pre-Government Income Position
We now turn to the results of our multivariate models explaining the level of pre-government incomes. Simultaneously controlling for a range of SES measures which are well-known to be linked to income risks (e.g., number of children, unemployment, health impairments, etc.)
we are explicitly interested in differences between the indigenous and non-indigenous populations. Beyond controlling for these SES measures, we subsequently improve the control of the immigrants' ethnic diversity.
When examining the non-indigenous population in the UK (Model Ia, Table 4 -UK), we find support for our bivariate analysis results, according to which the British non-indigenous population shows a labour market performance similar to that of the indigenous population;
i.e., there are no significant differences between the two groups. Results for the control variables show the expected pattern that is well known from labour market research:
Compared to the reference group of couples without children, each child additionally reduces market income, this effect being much stronger for lone parents with their reduced earnings capacity. We also confirm the typical age profile, with income decreasing at higher ages, as well as a positive effect for households headed by males, distinct educational differences, and a negative impact of impaired health status and recent unemployment. All these effects are 2001).
highly significant. However, we do not find any time effect in our pooled data, indicating that income levels in the UK remained stable over the observation period.
When differentiating between 'non-mixed' and 'mixed' households in the non-indigenous population (see section 3.2), we find the latter group to have similar performance levels as the indigenous reference group (Model Ib). On the other hand, the market (mainly employment)
incomes of immigrants remaining in a 'non-mixed' ethnic context are 20% lower than those of the indigenous population. This effect is highly significant. This finding underlines the importance of integration for immigrants to progress to higher economic levels.
When improving the control of differences in the immigrants' ethnicity and regional origin, as Finally, when restricting the analysis to the non-indigenous portion of our sample and using 'non-mixed' households as a reference category (Model Id), we find that 'mixed' households are indeed much better off than 'non-mixed' ones. Those immigrants coming from the Commonwealth perform better than the reference group of immigrants from EU countries, this effect being only significant at the 10% level, however. The same is true for the positive effect of a longer duration of stay in the UK. Not surprisingly, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis show significantly lower pre-government incomes than EU immigrants.
Turning to the German results (Table 4 -GE), we find quite a different pattern of results in our first model (Ia). This confirms the descriptive findings for Germany, which showed that immigrants as a whole had lower levels of economic performance than the indigenous population. Again, the expected outcomes emerged for our socio-economic control variables.
When introducing the 'non-mixed' and 'mixed' immigrant household categories (Model Ib), we find lower pre-government incomes for both subgroups in comparison to native-born 15 Germans. However, those living in 'non-mixed' ethnicity households are much worse off then those living in 'mixed' ones (-30% and -16%, respectively).
Controlling for ethnic origin in a more detailed form (Model Ic), we find Aussiedler and immigrants from non-EU countries to be high-risk groups, even when controlling for different SES structures. The negative effect for migrants from EU countries is rather small, and only significant at the 10% level. The longer the duration of stay, the higher the market (mostly employment) incomes--even after simultaneously controlling for age. The negative effect for the squared duration variable shows that economic integration of immigrants takes place at a rather early stage of residency.
When finally restricting the German sample to the non-indigenous population (Model Id), our first finding is that the 'mixed' immigrant population indeed performs significantly better than those living in 'non-mixed' contexts, most of whom are probably integrated in extended ethnic networks. Distinguishing between different ethnic groups, we detect that--compared to immigrants from EU countries--native-born foreigners are overperformers, whereas
Aussiedler and immigrants from non-EU countries are underperformers in terms of their economic situation. The positive effect of years since migration is similar to that reported for Model Ic.
Determinants of Income Redistribution
In this section, we finally focus on income redistribution effects. Again, we are primarily interested in cross-ethnic differences. The logic and sequence of stepwise introduction of more detailed measurements of ethnic diversity remains the same as in the previous section.
The measures of SES basically deliver the expected results: An increasing number of children, lone parenthood, increasing age of the household head, low levels of education, physical impairment, and recent unemployment all have a significant positive relation to the redistribution process, while, on average, households with younger heads, male heads, and highly educated heads pay into the system (i.e., their relative pre-government income position is higher than that based on their post-government income).
Starting once more with the situation in the UK (Table 5 -UK, Model IIa), there is no evidence that the non-indigenous population as a whole profits more from the redistribution process 16 than the indigenous one. This is even not the case for the 'non-mixed' immigrant population in our second model (IIb). On the contrary, those living in households of 'mixed' ethnicity contribute significantly more to the system than the indigenous population.
Blacks in the UK have lower pre-government incomes than the indigenous population (see Model Ic), but do not significantly profit from the redistribution process (Model IIc). A different situation emerges for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, who profit substantially from the UK redistribution process (but only at the 10% significance level).
When focusing only on the sample of non-indigenous UK inhabitants (model IId), we can observe that compared to the immigrant population living in 'non-mixed' ethnic households, those living in 'mixed' households help to finance the system. This effect is only significant at the 10% level, however. Surprisingly, there are no significant differences according to ethnicity or region of origin.
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Again, results for Germany differ markedly from those for the UK (Table 5- redistribution effects of the welfare system--the longer they stay, the better their market performance and the higher their own contributions to the tax and social security system.
Conclusions
Our results clearly indicate a more pronounced heterogeneity in the economic performance (capacity) of the non-indigenous population in the UK than that in Germany. In the UK, some ethnic groups even outperform the native-born white population (white immigrants and the residual category of 'other' immigrants, i.e., excluding Indians, blacks, and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis). In Germany, no such outperforming groups can be identified. On the whole, the foreign population in Germany profits substantially from the redistribution process, even when controlling for various SES measures such as educational level, number of children, unemployment, health status, etc. This result is accompanied by the observation that employment incomes rise markedly during the initial period of residency, and, as a result of improved economic self-support, reliance on the receipt of public transfers is reduced. In the UK, low employment incomes and a central role of public transfers were only observed in two very specific groups: blacks as well as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.
The 'better' or 'less costly' socio-economic structure of the non-indigenous UK population, combined with a less sheltering welfare state, leads to fundamental differences in eligibility for and take-up of benefits in the two countries analysed. It appears to be rather difficult to separate these two effects. Further studies need to concentrate on this important issue of crossnational comparative research. Average of 1994-1997 income years.
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